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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance has caused enthusiasm in many countries which is based on the 
relativ success of a few well-known microfinance institutions (MFIs), such as 
Grameen, in mobilising savings, distributing large amounts of credit with high 
repayment rates and a good outreach on a quite sustainable basis.  
Today, there is a vast amount on impact assessment and outreach studies in the 
field of microfinance whereas hardly any studies exist assessing the costs and 
benefits of microfinance institutions [De Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 233; 
Terberger-Stoy (2001), p. 58; Hishigsuren (1999), p. 16]. This absence of 
information might be due to the enthusiastic attitude towards the concept of 
microfinance, as well as to the relish of public support for microfinance, which 
hindered the emergence of critical questions [Terberger-Stoy (2001), p. 58]. 
However, critics of failed state-owned banks have formulated a devastating 
critique concerning public support of MFIs, while economic analysis also showed 
that, in principle, public support in microfinance can be well-designed [De 
Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 251] if donors and practitioners are aware of the 
level and kind of support desirable to achieve the best performance of MFIs. 
Due to the absence of information about costs and benefits of public support for 
MFIs and the rising critique of public support, the aim of this paper is to analyse 
the effects of public support to MFIs and their costs and benefits. 
Therefore, in the first chapter basics about microfinance and the financial sector in 
developing countries will be presented in order to explain the purpose of MFIs in 
developing countries. The second chapter deals with public support and its role in 
microfinance business. This chapter will conclude with a confrontation of the 
costs and benefits of MFIs generated due to public support. The third chapter 
describes the financial sector in Uganda and the microfinance activities in that 
country. The chapter also highlights the regulatory and supervisory framework of 
the microfinance sector in Uganda. 
The forth chapter analyses two selected Ugandan MFIs. This chapter will reveal if 
the two subsidised institutions are worthwhile in terms of costs and benefits for 
the poor and also show the subsidy dependence of the institutions over time. The 
paper finally concludes with a short discussion. 
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A. BASICS ABOUT MICROFINANCE 
 
1. Microfinance Institution - for what Purpose? 
Microfinance Institutions are institutions which offer loans, savings, financial and 
other related services to poor people. These people are normally excluded from 
commercial lending, either because their requested loan size is too small or they 
are unable to put up collateral or due to high transaction costs connected with 
lending to them. 
From the viewpoint of basic economics, the need for microfinance is somewhat 
surprising because of the principle of diminishing marginal returns to capital, 
which says that enterprises with relatively little capital should be able to earn 
higher returns on their investments than enterprises with a great deal of capital. 
Poorer enterprises should thus be able to pay banks higher interest rates than 
richer enterprises. Money should therefore flow from rich depositors to poor 
entrepreneurs. 
This principle of diminishing returns is derived from the assumed concavity of 
production functions, as illustrated in figure 1. Concavity is a product of the 
assumption that when an enterprise invests more (i.e., uses more capital), it should 
expect to produce more output, but each additional unit of capital will bring 
smaller and smaller marginal gains. 
Figure 1: Marginal Returns of Capital of rich and poor Entrepreneurs 
  [Adapted from de Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 5] 
Output
Capital
Marginal return for poorer 
entrepreneur
Marginal return for richer 
entrepreneur
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As the figure 1 shows, concavity implies that the poor entrepreneur has a higher 
marginal return to capital and thus a higher ability to repay lenders than a richer 
entrepreneur.  
According to these findings, an investor should invest more money in low-income 
countries where capital is relatively scarce and not in industrialised countries. 
Money should move from the North to the South, not out of altruism but in pursuit 
of profit. Furthermore, no one would expect investment to occur in the wealthy 
countries in the face of return differentials of this magnitude [De Aghion and 
Morduch (2005), pp. 5 and 6]. 
The economist Robert Lucas Jr. measured the extent of the expected difference in 
returns across countries. Lucas found out that borrowers in India should be willing 
to pay fifty-eight times as much for capital as borrowers in the United States, 
because the marginal product of capital in India is about fifty-eight times the 
marginal product of capital in the United States [Lucas (1990), .92]. 
According to this idea, one can argue that there is no need for microfinance 
institutions in developing countries due to the capital flows from rich to poor 
countries. However, the reality is far more different than the described model 
above. Capital flows in poor countries are quite scarce compared to the capital 
flows from wealthier countries. Of course, there are some investments made by 
wealthy countries in poorer ones, but these capital flows fall short compared to the 
flows predicted by the theory above. Some 80 percent of the world’s people living 
in low-and lower- middle-income economies do not have access to formal sector 
financial services [Robinson (2001), pp. 10 – 11]. The question why investments 
are in fact more likely to flow from poor to rich countries or flow within rich 
countries, and not in the other direction must be asked. Another question is what 
role MFIs are playing in this context. 
 
The principle of diminishing marginal returns, used above, assumed that 
education levels, business savvy, access to information commercial contracts, and 
access to other inputs are the same for people in developing countries and the ones 
in industrial countries. Since it is obvious that this is not true, the production 
function will not be the same for the rich and the poor [De Aghion and Morduch 
(2005), p. 17]. The new situation counting these differences is described in the 
following figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Marginal Returns to Capital for Entrepreneurs with differing 
complementary Inputs [Adapted from de Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 
18] 
 
The rich entrepreneur has a higher marginal return with the same amount of 
capital than the poorer entrepreneur. Due to less marginal returns the poorer 
entrepreneur can not pay for credit at high interests either  and therefore full 
repayment of loan might be almost impossible. 
 
Due to the missing links between the financial markets of developing countries 
and the poor and the unequal situation of poor and rich entrepreneurs MFIs arose 
to serve the poor, which are excluded from commercial financing. 
 
A look at the financial market in developing countries, shown in the next chapter, 
can provide an initial answer to some of these questions.  
 
Output 
Capital 
Marginal return for 
richer 
Marginal return for 
poorer 
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2. The Financial Sector in Developing Countries 
The following chapter will give a brief overview on the financial market in 
developing countries and point out the reasons for the inefficiency of the financial 
sector of these countries. 
One obvious main difference between financial sectors in industrialized and 
developing countries is that in developed countries the financial sector is often 
state-run and even the central reserve bank is not independent on the government 
[Hemmer (2002), p. 405]. Also there is no noteworthy competition among the 
financial institutions, so that oligopolistic and cartelised structures have arisen 
[Hemmer (2002), p. 407]. Therefore, the financial system in developing countries 
is not in the position to absorb economic shocks and deal with financial crisis nor 
is it in a state necessary for an effective monetary policy [Hemmer (2002), p. 
408]. 
Another main difference is the portion of informal lenders in the financial market. 
The informal sector is characterised by personal relationships, individual 
operators, ease of access, simple procedures, rapid transactions and flexible loan 
terms and amounts [Robinson (2001), p. 50]. Hoff and Stieglitz [(1993), p. 34], 
for example, found a share of the informal sector in developing countries ranging 
from 49 and 93 percent. The reason for the large proportion of informal 
institutions and lenders is based on the fact that, as discussed earlier, most of the 
poor people in developing countries are unable to get loans from commercial 
banks because the loans are too small compared with the thereby incurred costs 
and due to the fact that the poor do not have any securities to assure repayments. 
Another reason is the fact that the branches of commercial banks are often 
underrepresented in rural areas and villagers have no alternative but to keep the 
money under their mattress [KfW (2002), p. 18].  
A third point is scarce collateral. The borrowers in developing countries are often 
too poor to possess assets, like land, that could be collateralized. Furthermore 
poorly developed property rights make appropriating collateral in the event of 
default difficult especially in such areas [Besley (1994), p. 31].  
The fourth main difference is the problem of enforcing loan repayment. 
Enforcement problems can generally be divided into two parts. First of all, the 
lender must attempt to enforce repayment after a default has occurred. Secondly, 
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enforcement problems exist due to the poor development of property rights in 
developing countries [Besley (1994), p. 33].  
The problem of covariant risk due to segmented markets worsens the difficulties 
of enforcement. The credit market, especially in rural areas, tends to be 
segmented, meaning that the lender’s portfolio of loans is concentrated on a group 
of individuals facing common shocks to their incomes. This could happen in one 
particular geographic area or with farmers who produce one particular crop. 
The difficulties of enforcement also help to explain the widespread use of 
informal financial arrangements in developing countries.  
Informal arrangements can replace conventional solutions, such as physical 
collateral, with other mechanisms because they operate locally using local 
information and enforcement mechanisms like social ties [Besley (1994), p. 32]. 
Informal sanctions may persuade individuals to repay loans in situations where 
formal banks are unable to do so. 
 
3. Differences in Costs of Microfinance compared to Commercial 
Finance  
Since this discussion paper addresses in the costs of MFIs in the Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis later on, it is important to know why mircofinance lending 
is more expensive than commercial lending. This chapter therefore shows main 
differences of Microfinance and commercial finance.  
Microfinance differs in many ways from commercial finance because they do not 
have the same goal. While commercial banks focus on profit maximising, 
microfinance aims to offer financial services to clients who fail the criteria to 
acquire money from commercial banks. Nevertheless, microfinancing of course 
also intends to make profit, however, in order to reach sustainability. Table 1 
therefore shows the main differences of MFIs and commercial banks. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Commercial Banks and Microfinance Institutions 
Area Commercial Bank Microfinance Institution 
Lending Methodology   Based on collateral 
 More documentation 
 Less labor intensive 
 Loans are usually serviced 
monthly, quarterly, or 
yearly 
 Based on character 
 Less documentation 
 More labor intensive 
 Loans are usually serviced 
in weekly or bi-monthly  
Loan Portfolio  Fewer loans 
 Loans are larger in size 
 Collateralized 
 Longer maturity 
 More stable delinquency 
 More loans 
 Loans are smaller in size 
 Uncollaterilized 
 Shorter maturity 
 More volatile delinquency 
Institutional Structure  Profit maximizing 
institutional and individual 
shareholders 
 Creating by spin-off from 
existing regulated 
institutions 
 Centralized organizations 
with branch officers located 
in cities 
 Mainly non-profit 
institutional shareholders 
 Creation by conversion 
from NGO or formation of 
new entry 
 Decentralized set of small 
units in areas with weak 
infrastructure 
[Adapted from Berger (2000), p. 3.] 
 
Mainly due to the many small and labour intensive loans provided to poor 
customers, microfinance is more expensive than providing standard banking 
services to larger clients [Robinson (2001), p. 47]. It is not only due to the amount 
of loans disbursed, but also the fact that the clients are generally located a distance 
from the branch, require continuous monitoring and have high transaction costs 
which increases the costs of microfinancing [Ledgerwood, Burand and Braun 
(2002), p. 22]. Table 2 will give an overview of typical costs of a MFI compared 
to the cost of a commercial bank and a development bank. As one can see, the 
total operating costs of a MFI are much higher compared to the other institutions.  
The typical costs in this table reflect the costs for these institutions in Uganda. In 
other countries the proportion of these costs might be different but the primary 
statement will be the same. 
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Table 2: Comparison of typical MFI Costs with those of Other Financial Institutions (in US$) 
 Development 
Bank 
Commercial 
Bank 
MFI 
Portfolio size 9,090,000 9,090,000 9,090,000 
Average loan size 1,136,250 181,800 227.25 
Number of loans 8 50 40,000 
Managers 0.5 1 20 
Manageable case load 8 10 400 
No of officers necessary 1 5 100 
Av. Salary per Credit Officer (C.O.) 2,272.5 1,636.2 636.3 
C.O. salary cost per month for a Sh 
10 bn portfolio 
2,272.5 8,181 63,630 
Direct Costs: 
Annual C.O. salary per Sh 10bn 
portfolio 
Transport costs for field operations 
Back-office clerical & processing 
costs 
 
 
27,270 
 
1,818 
1,363.5 
 
98,172 
 
6,817.5 
4,545 
 
763,560 
 
45,450 
16,362 
 
Total direct costs 30,451.5 109,534.5 825,372 
Indirect operational costs 381,780 681,750 2,363,400 
Inflation (7%) 636,300 636,300 636,300 
Total operating costs 1,048,531.5 1,427,584.5 3,825,072 
Cost covering interest rate required 11.5% 15.7% 42.1% 
[Adapted from Ledgerwood , Burband and Braun (2002), p. 23.] 
 
This chapter pointed out why MFIs are much more costly than commercial 
institutions, and therewith often need to be supported. Hence, the next paragraph 
will go into more detail to show public support of MFI. Before that the following 
chapter will discuss the different situation of an entrepreneur in an industrialized 
country compared to one in a developing country. This is important since the 
access to capital is not the only factor for the success of someone’s project and the 
therewith connected repayment of loan. 
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B THE MATTER OF PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
1 The Role of Public Action 
The term public support includes support from governments, international donors 
and NGOs. This kind of support is not only limited to monetary support but also 
includes a variety of other kinds of support to MFIs. The main reason for public 
intervention is the fact that almost all MFIs make losses and rely on public 
support [Hardy, Holden, and Prokopenko (2002), p. 9]. This does not only apply 
to the very small MFIs but also to MFIs, which are considered to be very 
successful, like the Grameen Bank [Morduch (1999), p. 230]. Today, most of the 
existing MFIs depend on public support and would not be able to exist without it. 
Since public support is not without costs for society, the question has to be raised 
whether the subsidised MFIs are worth these costs. 
In the following the main types of public support and also the reasons and 
justification for public support are described. 
 
2 Public Support 
Donors and the government have two ways to intervene in the microfinance 
business: subsidies and/or regulation and supervision. While donors only 
intervene via subsidies, the government can also regulate and supervise the 
microcredit sector. Since the cost-effectiveness analysis only counts public 
support in form of subsidies, this paper will only go into this type of public 
support. 
A subsidy is generally a monetary grant given by the government or donors to 
lower the price, faced by producers or customers of a good (here the credit), 
because they are considered to be public interest. Microlenders take subsidies in 
many ways – not only in form of monetary grants. 
Sometimes subsidies are direct, for example in form of grants to help pay for staff 
training. Other subsidies are indirect and come via soft loans. A soft loan is a loan 
given by a donor, who might prefer to support a microfinance institution by 
granting a loan to be repaid within twenty years at an interest rate of one percent a 
year. The subsidy comes in when the interest on loans obtained through the 
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market would be higher. At other times, the subsidy may take the form of tax 
holidays, loan guarantees, soft equity or the assumption of exchange rate risk. 
To give an example how large subsidies can be, Morduch [(1999), p. 230; De 
Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 236] calculated for the period of 1985 – 1996, 
about 11 cents subsidy for every dollar on average in Grameen’s average loan 
portfolio  
 
3 Justification of Public Support 
Neoclassical theory stipulates that the free functioning of the market should lead 
to an optimal allocation of resources. In an idealised credit market therefore, loans 
are traded competitively and the interest rate is determined through supply and 
demand. Because individuals with the best investment opportunities are willing to 
pay the highest interest rates, the best investment opportunities should 
theoretically be selected. But because of market failiures, this optimal allocation 
can not be found in the credit market for poor people. 
Market failure is a situation in which markets do not efficiently organise 
production or allocate goods and services to consumers (for example, a failure to 
allocate goods in a way some see as socially or morally preferable). The term is 
normally applied to situations where the inefficiency is particularly dramatic, or 
when it is suggested that non-market institutions, like the state or donors, would 
provide a more desirable result. The following will discuss the main reasons of 
market failure that are most relevant in credit markets in developing countries. 
Even in the absence of market failures public support might be justified as an 
argument to protect depositors, protect the borrowers and to control their market 
power, to protect the financial system and public funds, to provide information for 
market participants, and to support innovation in microfinance. 
 
3.1 Imperfect Information 
In the case of imperfect information, the lender does not have sufficient 
information about the borrowers and the projects they are able to undertake. These 
information problems create inefficiencies. Credit markets can face significant 
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problems when due to imperfect information adverse selection and moral hazard 
may arise. 
 
(a) Adverse Selection 
In a credit market, risk-averse and risk-friendly borrowers are acting parts. In this 
case the risk-friendly borrowers are characterised with the highest risk of default 
and with higher demand for loans at a given interest rate. Due to the higher 
demand of risk-friendly borrowers the demand for loans increases. The lenders 
react to the hereby connected increasing risk and charge a risk premium above 
their opportunity costs. The effect is an increased price for loans and a shortage of 
loan supply, resulting in too little investment in the economy of the country. Risk-
averse borrowers will now retreat from the market and the risk for lenders in the 
market will increase. Due to imperfect information lenders do not have the ability 
to distinguish between the risk-averse borrowers and the risk-friendly ones and 
thus may make adverse selection [Borchert and Goos (2004), pp. 6 and 7]. 
According to de Aghion and Morduch [(2005), p. 35] public support can be seen 
as one attempt to overcome adverse selection, in this case Government policy that 
expands lending, e.g. through subsidies, raises welfare by offsetting the negative 
effect that high-risk borrowers create for good borrowers [Besley (1994). p. 36]. 
 
(b) Moral Hazard 
A second problem, which may arise due to imperfect information, is moral 
hazard, which can emerge when lenders are unable to appraise borrower’s actions 
or the realisation of project returns [De Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 43]. The 
central risk for the lender is that individuals who are in debt might slacken their 
efforts to make the project successful. 
An increase in interest rates can affect the behaviour of borrowers negatively, 
reducing their incentive to take actions, which are conductive to repaying their 
loans. Riskier projects are more attractive at higher interest rates because, at the 
higher interest rate the borrower will prefer a project that has a lower probability 
of being repaid, and borrowing money to invest in a project divides the risk 
between lender and borrower because if the project fails and the loan is not repaid, 
the lender bears the costs of the loan.  
 12 
3.2 Enforcement Problems and undefined Property Rights 
The enforcement problem, which is also often referred to as “ex post moral 
hazard”, emerges after the loan is issued and the borrower has invested. Even if 
those steps proceed well, the borrower may decide to take the money and run 
away once the project returns are realised [De Aghion and Morduch (2005), p. 
45]. Lenders in credit markets in developing countries often lack reliable 
mechanisms to enforce repayment. One reason are insufficient property rights, 
which hinder borrowers to use their land as collateral for loans. Since the lender 
does not have enough information about the client, he will require a collateral for 
the loan to minimise his risk of lending. But borrowers who cannot give such a 
guarantee might not be served by the lender although his project might be 
worthwhile. 
Furthermore, the enforcement problem will also occur when the borrower is 
unwilling to repay the loan. This kind of situation arises when the lender does not 
fully observe the borrowers’ profit, so the borrower can make false claims of loss 
and default. But the most effective solution is to tackle the root of the problem by 
establishing formal titles to land and clear property rights over assets that make it 
easier for the poor to offer collateral and for the lender to enforce contracts. This 
implies the need for public support by implementing adequate laws for property 
rights and by controlling their realisation and execution to overcome this problem. 
 
3.3 High Transaction Costs 
As mentioned earlier, credit markets in developing countries face high transaction 
cost. Lending money to poor people can make the existence of this markets no 
longer worthwhile [Arndt (1988), pp. 224- 225]. Due to this fact, commercial 
banks often are not willing to lend to them. Moreover, not only the banks face 
high costs. Poor clients also encounter substantial transaction costs (e.g. time and 
transportation costs) in dealing with banks, because banks are often not 
conveniently located. This costly access for the poor is considerably decreased by 
informal lenders, e.g. by being located close to their clients, and by speedier loan 
approvals [Okurut et al (2004), p. 6]. The failure which occurs here is, that there 
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are people who would like to borrow and lenders who have money to lend, but 
due to too high transaction cost no deal with the poor takes place.  
According to Myint [1985] the incomplete state of development of the 
organisational framework causes much of the high transaction costs. If 
government or donors are able to reduce these costs by implementing more public 
support, e.g. by strengthening the organisational framework by the government or 
subsidies from donors more people will be served by loans. But this has to be 
handled with care because in some cases public support might worsen the problem 
due to the implementation of a wrong or too bureaucratic organisational 
framework. 
 
4 Costs and Benefits of Public Support 
The following table 3 gives a summary about the cost and benefits of the different 
types of public support. As a matter of course the summarised costs and benefits 
do not occur in each MFI nor in each country in the same way depending on the 
existing macro- and microeconomic situation of the respective country and as well 
as the chosen type and scope of public support in this country.  
The matrix itself does not indicate where relative importance should lie, but it 
places non-financial costs and benefits, on par with financial cost and benefits. 
Thus, the matrix provides a way to present the relationship between costs and 
benefits without reducing them to monetary units [Ziller (2003), pp. 142 - 146]. 
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Table 3:  General summarizing Conspectus of Costs and Benefits of the three 
different Types of Public Support 
 Costs Benefits 
Subsidy  Costs of donors and government for 
supporting the MFI 
 Perverse effects on other market 
participants, e.g. due increasing of 
marginal costs of lender, 
enforcement externalities, and 
weakening of reputation effect and 
therewith increasing interest rates  
 If ongoing subsidy: increase of 
moral hazard and therewith poor 
management, aid dependence, 
weakening of the incentives to 
achieve sustainability, suppressing 
the scope of competition and 
creating a lack of innovation, 
weaken budget discipline, 
diminishing and misallocating of 
resources for the poor 
 Helps to overcome of start-up costs 
 Financing of innovation 
 Giving ability to serve the very poor 
and to conduct business 
 
Regulation  Costs of complying 
 Cost for officers and bureaucracy 
 Costs of failures 
 Cramps competition 
 Bears down innovations 
 Risk of imposition of interest rate 
controls 
 Danger of over regulation 
 Protection of depositors and 
borrowers 
 Increase in efficiency by facilitating 
improved use of collateral 
 Greater access to sources of funds 
 Greater ability to offer services 
beyond microcredit 
 Improving of operational procedures 
through meeting higher standards 
 Enhanced legitimacy in the financial 
sector 
 Building transparency and security 
 Network of financial branches in 
rural areas 
Supervision  Reporting requirements for MFI 
 Supervision costs from 1 to 5 
percent of assets 
 High cost for the government for 
supervisors and the institutional 
framework 
 Endanger effective supervision of 
other institutions 
 Providing information about the 
performance of regulation in practice 
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C MICROFINANCE IN UGANDA 
 
1. The Financial Sector in Uganda 
The financial system in Uganda is characterised by the co-existence of formal and 
informal financial markets. The formal market is dominated by seventeen 
commercial banks which are fully controlled by the private sector, six credit 
institutions which are subject to supervision by the Bank of Uganda (BOU) and 
three development banks which are non-deposit-taking institutions and are not 
supervised by the BOU [Apire (2002), p. 14]. 
The financial sector in Uganda has significantly improved despite the turbulence 
it has experienced since 1992. At this time some commercial banks were closed 
and there was an interruption in the sale of the Bank of Uganda. These factors 
together with a slow response by the government to unfreeze savings accounts, 
and accordingly pay depositors of failed banks, contributed in a major way to the 
decline in the general public’s confidence in the countries banking system [Apire 
(2002), p. 15]. The improvements within the financial sector are evident in the 
expansion of the sector and the increased number of monetary instruments 
available for undertaking financial transactions, liberalisation of interest and 
foreign exchange rates, as well as government divesting from the management of 
public sector banks. However, these implemented improvements are mainly 
macro-level policies and experience in other developing countries has shown that 
such policies and deregulation of the formal financial sector has not increased the 
access to formal finance for the poor [Okurut et al (2004), p. 4]. 
Uganda’s financial sector, also still has some weaknesses. The sector lacks 
medium to long-term finance and has a low savings-to-GDP ratio. The sector also 
has generally high operating costs, which have kept commercial bank lending 
rates at high levels. While treasury rates are at 7.6 percent, lending rates average 
24 percent [Hanning and Mugwanya (2000), p. 3]. 
Furthermore, the commercial banks in Uganda are located almost entirely in the 
urban areas and offer only a narrow range of financial services. They concentrate 
on providing working capital mainly to medium and large-scale enterprises. And 
“the formal financial institutions are inflexible in their operations, with respect to 
the needs of small – scale enterprises and the poor people in the rural areas who 
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may not have collateral or well-written feasibility studies to solicit for loans” 
[Nannyonjo and Nsubuga (2004), p. 8]. Above all, the access to formal lenders for 
poor people in Uganda is restricted due to stringent requirements which include 
high minimum balances for account opening, onerous collateral requirements for 
loans, and long and costly bureaucratic processes [Okurut et al (2004), p. 4]. The 
result of this constrained access to formal credit is, that the poor rely almost 
exclusively on the informal sector. The Uganda Bureau of Statistics estimates that 
only 10 percent of the rural population and 5 percent of the rural poor have access 
to financing services in terms of savings and credit [UBOS (2005)]. 
A survey by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics undertaken in 1999/2000 found out 
that circa 90 percent of rural and urban people have never applied for a loan and 
that out of the people who applied for a loan only 0.5 percent took their loan from 
a bank while the rest took their loan from informal lenders. According to the data, 
of those who did not apply for credit, only 45 percent indicated that they did not 
need such a credit. The remainder were mainly pessimistic about their own ability 
to access such a credit. Despite the fact that several commercial banks and MFIs 
operate in Uganda, around 50 percent of people who would like to take a loan or 
deposit their money do not have access to financial services, which shows that the 
financial market in Uganda only reaches half of the potential clients. 
 
2. Players of Microfinance Industry in Uganda 
The main players of the microfinance industry in Uganda besides the MFIs itself 
are the Bank of Uganda, the Microfinance Forum, and the Association of Micro 
Finance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU). 
 
(a) Bank of Uganda 
The Bank of Uganda (BOU) is the central bank of the country. In late 1999, the 
BOU issued a Policy Statement on Microfinance Regulation that confirmed the 
role of the government as an enabler, instead of a provider, of microfinance 
[Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, and Latortue (2004), pp. 5 - 6]. 
The BOU, as a key player in formulating a regularly framework for regulation and 
supervision of the microfinance sector, regulates microfinance under a tired 
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framework and aims to create an enabling environment for the growth of the rural 
financial system [Kalyango (2005), pp. 5 and 9]. 
 
(b) Microfinance Forum 
The Microfinance Forum (MFF) is chaired by the government. It was created to 
facilitate the dialogue between the stakeholders and all of those involved in the 
founding of the MFF. In 1998 the Ministry of Finance formally requested that the 
forum becomes the main discussion group for microfinance, where new 
developments and constraints in the microfinance industry should be discussed 
Furthermore, informal contracts among donors, MFIs and representatives of the 
Ministry of Finance are channelled into a more formal mechanism for 
collaboration through this forum. The MFF monitors developments and provides 
guidelines for practitioners and donors, participates actively in policy formulation, 
monitors and evaluates the performance of the microfinance industry. It prepares 
and monitors grant-based support initiatives for the poorest of the poor. Today, 
the MFF has become the most important collaborative mechanism in Uganda 
[Nannyonjo and Nsubuga (2004), pp. 19 and 23-24; Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, and 
Latortue (2004), pp. 5, 10 and 26]. 
 
(c) Association of Micro Finance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU) 
AMFIU is run by MFIs. It is an umbrella organization of MFIs throughout 
Uganda. AMFIU was founded in 1996 and has a membership of more than 100 
MFIs [AMFIU (2005)] which represents more than 80 percent of the microfinance 
market in terms of clients and loan [AMFIU (2003), p. 9]. 
AMFIU’s aim is to create a national network of MFIs. Therefore it monitors the 
performance of MFIs especially of non-deposit taking MFIs, lobbies the 
government to push the development of an appropriate legal framework for MFIs, 
and develops education programmes for MFI clients. AMFIU also coordinates 
and organises learning workshops, exchange visits, seminars etc. with other 
organizations and the public for members [AMFIU (2005)]. A critical point 
according to AMFIU is the unresolved conflict of interest between promoting 
member interests and monitoring member activities [Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, and 
Latortue (2004), p. 27]. 
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3. Microfinance in Uganda Today  
In 2003 most of the MFIs were situated in Kampala and other big cities of the 
urban areas, although three quarters of Uganda are rural [Wright and Rippey, 
(2003), p .i]. These MFI started to compete more for clients than for donor funds 
and it seems certain that the large number of financial service providers that now 
exist is more than the market will be able to support. Consolidation is therefore 
inevitable in the urban regions [Wright and Rippey, (2003), p.i], while the rural 
area still remains underserved with MFIs. The limited number of MFIs operation 
in the northern region can be attributed to the ongoing insurgency in that region of 
the country and the therewith higher transaction costs and risk for MFIs. 
Furthermore MFIs are mainly located in the urban area to reach a critical mass of 
clients in order to operate with moderately low overheads [Nannyonjo and 
Nsubuga (2004), p. 11; Ledgerwood, Burand and Braun (2002), p. 1]. 
In 2004 AMFIU counted over 500 registered MFIs [Ledgerwood, Burand and 
Braun, (2002), p. 1] and according to estimations from the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) there were more than 2,000 non-regulated MFI [Köhler, 
(2004), p. 18]. Commercial banks are also increasingly recognising the potential 
of the microfinance market and are currently focussing on small savings 
mobilisation. Currently, one commercial bank, Centenary Rural Development 
Bank (CERUDEB), operates in the microfinance sector [Hanning and Mugwanya 
(2000), p. 3]. 
In this year Uganda had a population of nearly 24 million and close to 1.5 million 
people were employed in micro- and small enterprises [Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, 
and Latortue (2004), p. 3]. The typical clientele consists of women groups in 
urban areas carrying out trade and produce buying [Hanning and Mugwanya 
(2000), p. 3]. 
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D ANALYSIS OF THE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS FINCA 
AND FAULU UGANDA 
 
Aim of this analysis is to identify if the two subsidised MFIs investigated here are 
worthwhile in terms of costs and benefits and to what extent they depend on 
subsidies. Therefore two approaches are presented below to answer these 
questions. 
 
1. FINCA Uganda and Faulu Uganda at a Glance 
 
1.1 FINCA Uganda  
Founded in 1992, FINCA Uganda has provided micro-finance services utilising a 
group-based lending methodology to economically active poor women for more 
than a decade. FINCA Uganda is one of the five African affiliates of FINCA 
International Inc. and has been using the Village Banking Methodology developed 
by FINCA International. Today, FINCA Uganda is still wholly controlled by 
FINCA International. In Uganda, FINCA has one headquarter and six regional 
branches. In 2003, FINCA Uganda was the first MFI transforming into an MDI. 
Until today FINCA Uganda is the only MDI in the country. Today, FINCA 
Uganda offers loans, voluntary savings, insurance, and leasing. In 2004, FINCA 
Uganda had 43,420 clients, compared to 36,912 clients in 2003. The clients of 
FINCA Uganda are almost exclusively women. In 2004 FINCA had around 90 
percent female members. The average loan balance in 2004 was 133 US $ 
compared to 66 US $ in 2003 [FINCA (2005)]. The main sources of funding are 
still grants besides loans and savings. 
 
1.2 Faulu Uganda 
Faulu Uganda was founded in 1995 as a programme of Food for the Hungry and 
incorporated as a company limited by shares in 1999. A long-term goal of Faulu is 
to transform into an MDI. Therefore Faulu Uganda must still secure funding for 
about 40 percent of its transformation costs. Currently, the MFI does not meet the 
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transformation requirements [MicroRate (2004), p. 2]. The main sources of 
funding are grants, loans, and shareholder capital. In 2004, Faulu Uganda ceased 
intermediating clients’ savings because the MFI is still unregulated and is ill-
equipped to manage the risks of this practice [MicroRate (2004), pp. 1-2]. Today, 
Faulu Uganda has four urban and four rural branches in Uganda, whereas the four 
rural branches were all founded in 2003. In 2004, Faulu Uganda had 31,459 
clients compared to 570 in 1998. The portfolio in 2004 was about 2,771,267 US $ 
compared to 251,167 US $. Currently, Faulu Uganda offers loans, insurance, and 
training and consulting. 
 
2. Cost-Effectiveness-Analysis of the Institutions 
2.1 The Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) 
The following remarks about the CEA are based on the work of Mark Schreiner 
[(1997), especially chapter 8]. 
The CEA is a way to check if a subsidised MFI is the best way to help the poor by 
measuring the cost to the poor in a so-called test of bang-for-the-buck. The test of 
bang-for-the-buck answers the question asked by the poor: How much benefit per 
output would offset costs? Therefore, this analysis compares the cost of the poor 
per unit of output for the poor with a ratio of discounted flows of costs to 
discounted flows of output: 
 
.coscos
outputsofstreamDiscounted
poortotsofstreamDiscountedpoortotAverage =  (1) 
 
Less cost per unit of output means that the poor require less consumer surplus per 
unit of output to offset costs and to make a MFI worthwhile. All else constant, the 
lower the cost to the poor per unit of output, the more likely a MFI would pass a 
benefit-cost analysis.  
Schreiner suggests that the costs to the poor can be considered as a loss of welfare 
caused by the MFI since the funds were not used in the best other development 
project and measures these costs as the net present costs (NPCP) of the flows of 
funds between the poor and the MFI. 
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The NPCP are the result of discounted outflows minus discounted inflows: 
 
NPCP = Discounted outflows - Discounted inflows (2) 
 
The output of a typical MFI can be measured as the average amount of dollars 
outstanding (dollar-years-debt), the average number of loans outstanding (loan-
years of loans), the amount of dollars disbursed, the amount of loans disbursed, or 
years of membership, whereby Schreiner suggests that outputs should be 
measured not as stocks but as flows. 
The presented framework of the CEA has the advantage that it is very easy, 
simple and fast compared to a full blown Cost-Benefit-Analysis. 
But nevertheless the CEA has some weak points too. The most important 
weakness of this framework is that it uses financial data derived for other 
purposes and follows accounting principles instead of economic logic. Accounting 
data is seldom good and normally not appropriate for the purposes discussed here) 
and Schreiner put this into the words [Schreiner (1997), p. 209]: «Garbage in gets 
garbage out». 
 
2.2 Assumptions 
The adjusted statements of FINCA and Faulu Uganda are taken from the end-of-
year financial statements. I assume that FINCA Uganda started its activities in 
1997 with no net worth because there was no financial data available before 1997. 
Before FINCA Uganda transformed into an MDI, it was tax-exempt until 2002. 
Schreiner [1997] assumed a surplus for the poor d of two cents only per dollar-
year of deposits because the deposits of the MFI he investigated were forced and 
members chose to make deposits as part of the price of membership. For 
Schreiner, this was reason to assume that the poor do not benefit a lot from forced 
deposits [Schreiner (1997), p. 271]. Since the deposits on FINCA Uganda are not 
forced, I assume a higher surplus for the poor d of four cents for the years 2003 
and 2004. The years before, FINCA Uganda did not take deposits. 
For Faulu Uganda I assume that it started its activities in 1998 with no net worth, 
since there was no financial data available before 1998. Faulu Uganda was tax-
exempt until 2002. As with FINCA Uganda, I assume a surplus for the poor d of 
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four cents per dollar-year of deposits until 2003 because the deposits of Faulu also 
were voluntary savings. As mentioned above, Faulu Uganda did stop savings in 
2004, therefore d is zero for that year. 
 
2.3 Results 
The net present costs to the poor of the use of funds in FINCA Uganda were 
roughly between $0.8 million (line bb of table 7 on page VII) in 1997 and $1.8 
million in 2004. The Output of FINCA Uganda (seen as average loan portfolio, 
loans disbursed, member years, and number of loans disbursed) grew each year. 
The bang-for-the–buck for the cost to the poor per dollar-year of debt showed a 
required surplus to offset costs of 31 cents for each dollar lend by the poor. This 
means that FINCA Uganda was worthwhile in the years 1997 to 2004 if the 
average borrower could get a surplus of 31 cent of each dollar lent in those years 
(line t of table 8 on page VIII).  
For Faulu Uganda the net present costs to the poor of the use of funds were about 
$0.9 million in 1998 (line bb of table 13 on page XIII) and $1.4 million in 2004. 
The Output of Faulu Uganda (seen as average loan portfolio, loans disbursed, and 
member years) grew each year. 
The bang-for-the–buck for the cost to the poor per dollar-year of debt showed a 
required surplus to offset costs of 54 cents for each dollar lend by the poor (line t 
of table 14 on page XIV). This means that Faulu Uganda was worthwhile in the 
years 1998 to 2004 if the average borrower could get a surplus of 54 cent of each 
dollar lent in this year.  
Compared to the results for Grameen (10 cent required surplus) and BancoSol (6 
cent required surplus) calculated by Schreiner [(1997), pp. 178 and 184], the 
required surplus for FINCA and Faulu Uganda are quite high.  
The required surplus of FINCA Uganda for the other years ranges from 30 cents 
to 41 cents and did not decrease over the years but has its ups and downs. From 
1997 to 2004, FINCA Uganda helped more poor customers the same rather than 
helping the same poor customers more. This follows since output grew each year 
but the surplus required to offset costs was more or less constant over this time.  
The required surplus of Faulu Uganda for the other years ranges from 54 cents to 
134 cents. From 1999 to 2004, Faulu Uganda helped more the same poor 
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customers rather than helping more poor customers the same. This follows since 
output grew each year and the surplus required to offset costs decreased since 
1999 constantly from 134 cents to 54 cents. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Both institutions have a high-required surplus to offset the costs to the poor. In 
contrary to FINCA Uganda, Faulu Uganda was able to reduce these costs over the 
years. The high costs of both institutions compared to Grameen and BancoSol 
might be due to the age of the two other institutions and hence their experience in 
microfinance business. BancoSol, for example, also had very high-required 
surplus of about 76 cent in 1988 [Schreiner (1997), p. 178]. This also might 
explain why the younger MFI Faulu Uganda has a higher required surplus 
compared to FINCA Uganda. But of course there a many other factors, like clients 
and different services offered, which lead to different required surpluses of the 
institutions. Despite the higher required surplus of Faulu Uganda, due to its 
constant decrease of required surplus from 1999 till today, Faulu Uganda was a 
better investment of public funds, since one can expect further decreases of 
required surplus over the next years below 30 cents, while FINCA Uganda seems 
to remain at around 40 to 30 cents of required surplus in the future, too. 
 
3. Subsidy Dependence Index of the Institutions 
3.1 Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) 
The SDI answers the question how far a subsidised MFI - which may be 
worthwhile or not - is from being able to pay market prices for all its funds. 
The SDI is a sensitivity test that shows the required change in the average lending 
interest rate for the MFI to maintain its business without public support [Yaron 
(1992), p. 18]. The interest rate is not the only possibility to reduce dependence on 
subsidies. The SDI takes this assumption because of its simplicity and because 
lending is the prime activity of most of the MFIs [Yaron (1992), p. 16; Schreiner 
(1997), p. 96]. 
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The SDI is defined as follows [Schreiner (1997), p. 89]: 
 
)2/1( α⋅−⋅⋅= riLP
SSDI . (7) 
 
Where  S = Annual subsidy received by an MFI, 
 LP = Loan Portfolio, 
 i = Yield on lending, 
 r = Opportunity cost of equity for the market, and 
 α  = Conversion factor, start and end stocks to average stock. 
 
Not the grant itself is the subsidy. Donors entrust subsidised resources to an MFI 
that are priced below the opportunity costs of these resources. The difference 
between the opportunity cost and the price the MFI pays is then a subsidy 
[Schreiner (1996), p.4] and it is defined by Yaron [(1992), p. 17] and Schreiner 
[(1997), p. 81] as: 
 
KAPrEcmDS +−⋅+−⋅= ])[()( . (8) 
 
Where: D = Average soft debt, 
 m = Opportunity cost of soft debt1 for the market, 
 c = Rate paid by an MFI on soft debt, 
E = Average equity, 
AP = Accounting profit and 
 K = sum of revenue grants and discount on expenses. 
 
The biggest strength of the SDI is that it shows the extent of the subsidy by 
quantifying it. Furthermore, it shows the extent of subsidy dependence. Since 
donors and the government often do not know how much an MFI costs society, 
the SDI allows them to compare MFIs with other uses of public funds. Second, 
with the SDI, one can see the development of subsidy dependence over time and 
see if the MFI could improve or not. 
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A limitation of the SDI is that it does not discount flows of funds, which is no 
issue in short time frames but in long time frames. Furthermore, the SDI does not 
measure self-sustainability. A negative SDI is needed, but it is not enough [Yaron 
and Schreiner (1999), p. 18]. 
 
3.2 The SDI of FINCA and Faulu Uganda 
The SDI of FINCA Uganda in 2004 was 94 percent (line l of table 9 on page IX), 
while the nominal yield was 76 percent (line m). The change to reach subsidy-free 
yield in 2004 was 0.71 (line n). With inflation at 5 percent (line p), the real 
subsidy free yield was 137 percent (line q). This subsidy free yield did decrease 
since 2001, before the subsidy free yield did not follow any rule and had its ups 
and downs. In the years 2000 and 2003 FINCA Uganda had a quite low 
dependence on subsidies, but increased again in the following years. 
The amount of subsidy per year peaked in 2004 at about $2.5 million (line k).  
These numbers conclude that if FINCA Uganda wants to survive without 
subsidies it would have to charge an interest of about 137 percent in 2004 for 
loans on its borrowers.  
The SDI of Faulu Uganda in 2004 was 66 percent (line l of table 15 on page XV). 
The change to reach in 2004 subsidy-free yield was 0.38 (line n). With inflation at 
5 percent (line p), the real subsidy free yield was 86 percent (line q). The subsidy 
free yield did decrease since 1998 till 2003, and increased a bit in 2004, which 
might be reasoned due to the looking of Faulu Uganda for fund because of the 
high transformation cost to become an MDI. The amount of subsidy per year 
peaked in 2004 at about 639,504 US $ (line k).  
These numbers conclude that if Faulu Uganda wants to survive without subsidies 
it would have to charge an interest of about 86 percent in 2004 for loans on its 
borrowers. 
 
                                                                                                                       
1 The soft debt is e.g. a loan taken by the MFI which is not at market interest rates but at lower 
subsidized interest rates. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
The SDI showed the amount of subsidies injected into the MFIs analysed, and the 
dependence on subsidies over time. The data showed that FINCA Uganda 
received more subsidies than Faulu Uganda. Contrary to FINCA Uganda, Faulu 
Uganda could decrease constantly its dependence on subsidies over time. But one 
cannot compare both institutions like this, since all else is not constant e.g. 
FINCA Uganda has more clients than Faulu Uganda and also the loan portfolio is 
much bigger at FINCA Uganda.  
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E DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this paper was to identify the costs and benefits of MFIs in the light of 
the public support granted to them. Since funds earmarked to help the poor are 
scarce, one has to know the amount of public support injected into a MFI and the 
costs and benefits it generates in order to judge if public support of that MFI is a 
worthwhile investment of these funds. 
As shown in chapter B, public support of MFIs takes various forms, whereas the 
chosen type of public support has an influence on the nature of benefits and costs 
of the MFI. The main reason why donors and the government support MFIs is due 
to market failures. An obvious purpose of intervention is to subsidise early 
innovators, but subsidies should be phased out along the way in order to avoid 
negative side-effects [Besley (1994), p. 44]. Continued subsidies will not 
strengthen MFI operations but undermine management efficiency and clients` 
behaviour if they get the impression that the cheap credit is a gift. Other tools 
considered appropriate for strengthening MFIs are regulation and supervision. 
Creating a special microfinance legal framework seems to make most sense in a 
country where a critical mass of strong MFIs that are in a position to use such a 
framework safely already exists [Christen and Rosenberg (2000), p. 16)]. But one 
also has to keep in mind that government regulation holds the threat of over-
regulation and the corresponding negative effects on microfinance business 
especially on innovation. In the case of Uganda, there is an exemplary system of 
regulation and supervision. The MDI Act of 2003 found many supporters. 
Unfortunately, today there is only one institution in the country that could fulfil all 
requirements and bear the therewith-associated transformation costs. 
The framework of the CEA used in this paper showed that the MFIs analysed here 
are apparently not worthwhile in terms of costs and benefits for the poor because 
the required surplus to offset cost to the poor was very high and I doubt that the 
poor will gain this surplus for each dollar lent. The analysis could not point out if 
the MFIs were worthwhile or not in terms of costs and benefits for society. But 
donors can use the CEA to find out if a MFI is worthwhile in terms of costs and 
benefits to the poor. The CEA has the advantage for donors that it is much 
cheaper and easier than a full-blown cost-benefit analysis and therefore it is quite 
practical for donors who are interested in the costs and benefits of a MFI. 
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To know the amount of public support injected into a MFI, the framework of the 
SDI by Yaron was used. The SDI also showed the subsidy dependence of the 
MFIs over time. The analysis disclosed that both institutions would not be able to 
operate without public support. To become independent from subsidies, the yield 
on lending would have to be so high that on the one hand borrowers might not be 
able to pay the interest and on the other hand borrowers also would not be willing 
to lend to these institutions. Since the microfinance business in Uganda is quite 
competitive, they would prefer to lend from other institutions. Therefore, raising 
interest rates to that level is not an option for these MFIs for becoming 
independent from subsidies. Donors can use the SDI to know how much the 
public support of the MFI will cost them and if the MFI could decrease its subsidy 
dependence over time because the long-term goal of each MFI should be to 
survive without subsidies after the start-up so that the scarce funds can be used in 
another project or another new MFI to help the poor. 
Donors should be aware of the costs and benefits of the different types of public 
support, since they affect not only the MFI itself but also cause side-effects on 
other market participants. This knowledge is necessary to allocate scarce 
development funds wisely. The presented framework in this paper is one way of 
helping donors to judge if the investment in a MFI is worthwhile or not. 
As a matter of course the framework does not claim to be complete and without 
weaknesses but the advantages of the two presented frameworks are their 
practicability, low costs and relative simplicity. 
 IV
APPENDICIES 
 
Table 4: FINCA adjusted Assets and Liabilities, 1997-2004 
Year ending Aug. 31 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Cash and short-term invest 208.095 116.709 382.024 493.336 601.899 473.552 493.840 258.442 
Portfolio performing 332.077 731.558 955.550 1.391.024 1.713.971 2.559.960 2.852.706 6.045.837 
Portfolio contaminated arrears 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portfolio (gross) 341.132 750.876 981.238 1.412.400 1.713.971 2.559.960 2.922.456 6.195.650 
Reserve for loan losses (9.055) (19.318) (25.688) (21.376) (27.962) (54.799) (69.750) (149.814) 
Portfolio (net) 332.077 731.558 955.550 1.391.024 1.686.010 2.505.161 2.852.706 6.045.837 
Deprec. fixed assets (net) 24.173 61.600 67.130 132.949 214.482 296.851 434.007 647.171 
Non-deprec. fixed assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.867 42.900 
Total fixed assets (net) 24.173 61.600 67.130 132.949 214.482 296.851 444.874 690.071 
Long-term invest. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 752.230 
Other assets 26.113 42.250 124.728 90.448 547.952 336.837 365.259 281.472 
Total assets 590.458 952.117 1.529.432 2.107.758 3.050.341 3.612.400 4.156.680 8.028.052 
       
Deposit libs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 613.116 1.328.490 
Market debt 0 0 181.057 161.977 336.383 290.970 135.270 1.627.736 
Soft debt 82.739 42.862 44.238 30.176 342.731 309.680 269.433 3.241.917 
Other libs 19.564 38.700 31.663 147.721 127.132 176.725 131.190 484.739 
Total liabilities 102.303 81.562 256.958 339.874 806.246 777.375 1.149.010 6.682.882 
Source: Financial statements of FINCA. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 5:  FINCA adjusted Income Statement, 1997 - 2004 
Year ending Aug. 31 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Rev. lending, LP*i 122.169 284.694 547.273 1.159.255 1.609.995 2.057.305 2.630.164 3.385.058
Rev. investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rev. adj. inflation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Exp. adj. inflation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Exp.int. deposit libs. 0 0 0 0 0 0 (78.463) (251.093)
Exp. int. market debt 0 0 (8.542) (34.726) (27.071) (39.699) (6.648) (72.575)
Exp. int. soft debt (375) (2.522) (3.425) (1.895) (118.874) (79.704) (21.121) (192.956)
Financial Margin 121.794 282.173 535.306 1.122.634 1.464.050 1.937.902 2.523.931 2.868.434
Rev. other op. 5.053 9.950 11.314 26.396 72.636 137.712 263.589 64.764
Exp. other op. (162.012) (327.069) (223.277) (466.146) (251.949) (633.086) (561.149) (622.140)
Exp. prov. reserve for loan loss (5.936) (10.263) (6.877) (2.380) (17.091) (44.616) (14.950) (101.110)
Exp. extraord. write-offs(net) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (11.473)
Exp. personnel n.a. n.a. (322.200) (382.833) (613.598) (827.912) (1.003.179) (1.540.395)
Exp. adminsitration n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. (683.678) (833.692) (945.629) (1.354.006)
Exp. depreciation (9.415) (17.505) (24.963) (33.029) (60.549) (97.165) n.a. n.a.
Operating margin (50.516) (62.714) (30.697) 264.643 (90.179) (360.857) 262.613 (695.927)
Rev. extraordinary (net) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rev. grants, RG 176.801 299.082 295.020 21.687 316.381 321.717 155.082 266.444
Acct. profit, AP 126.285 236.368 264.323 286.330 226.203 (39.140) 417.695 (429.483)
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (25.974)
Dividends declared, Div 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change retained earnings 126.285 236.368 264.323 286.330 226.203 (39.140) 417.695 (455.456)
Source: Financial statements of FINCA. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 6: FINCA adjusted Equity, 1997-2004 
Year ending Aug. 31 1.997 1.998 1.999 2.000 2.001 2.002 2.003 2.004 
Open retained earnings 140.484 215.671 433.245 680.892 897.600 1.061.465 1.040.340 1.343.089 
Change retained earnings 71.317 217.574 247.647 216.709 163.865 (21.126) 302.749 (422.037) 
Close retained earnings 215.671 433.245 680.892 897.600 1.061.465 1.040.340 1.343.089 921.052 
Open reserve adj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change reserve and adj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Close reserve and adj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Open direct grants 261.145 272.484 401.116 528.576 684.992 876.886 1.438.648 1.169.940 
Change direct grants 11.339 128.632 127.461 156.416 191.894 561.762 (268.708) (1.015.490) 
Close direct grants 272.484 401.116 528.576 684.992 876.886 1.438.648 1.169.940 154.450 
Open-paid-in cap. public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change paid-in cap. public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Close paid-in cap. public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Open-paid-in cap. private 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change paid-in cap. private 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.516.748 
Close paid-in cap. private 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 965.067 
Total equity 488.155 834.361 1.209.468 1.582.592 1.938.351 2.478.988 2.513.029 2.040.569 
Source: Financial statements of FINCA. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 7: FINCA Net Present Cost to the Poor since Birth in 1997 through 2004 
Line Year ending Aug. 31   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a Real opp. cost Equity for the poor Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b inflation given IAS 29 practice Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c Nom. opp. cost equity for poor rho a+b+a*b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d Beta 0 Data 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e Beta t Data 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f Delta for poor at the end of the year f(t-1)*(1/(1+c)) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
g Gamma for the poor, since birth Data 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
h Beta t*Delta e*f 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
i Start Equity Eo Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
j Fresh funds less (TP-Tax), FF Data 638.229 645.527 641.124 638.928 1.064.597 993.743 888.826 1.812.765
k Accumulated FF k(t-1)+j 638.229 1.283.756 1.924.880 2.563.809 3.628.406 4.622.148 5.510.974 7.323.739
l Accum. discounted FF l(t-1)+g*j 529.730 942.867 1.327.542 1.583.113 1.934.430 2.321.990 2.508.643 2.816.813
m Private paid-in capital Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.516.748
n Accum. private paid-in cap. n(t-1)+m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.516.748
o Accum. disc. private paid-in cap. 0(t-1)+g*m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 257.847
p Dividends, Div. Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q Accumulated Dividends q(t-1)+p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r Accum. discounted dividends r(t-1)+l*p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s True Profit Data (60.455) (79.951) (43.532) 254.005 (526.486) (726.310) 2.077 (1.880.402)
t Actual Tax Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u True Profit less actual tax s-t (60.455) (79.951) (43.532) 254.005 (526.486) (726.310) 2.077 (1.880.402)
v Accum. TP-Tax v(t-1)+u (60.455) (140.407) (183.938) 70.066 (456.420) (1.182.730) (1.180.653) (3.061.055)
w Term 1 (d-h)*i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x Term 2 l-h*k 32.667 141.738 334.466 543.248 750.663 1.050.081 1.301.628 1.537.669
y Term 3 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 257.847
z Term 4 r-h*q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
aa Term 5 h*v (47.084) (87.621) (94.897) 28.418 (148.907) (325.460) (258.587 -534.636
bb NPC of Poor since birth w+x-(y+z+aa) 79.751 229.359 429.363 514.829 899.570 1.375.541 1.560.215 1.814.457
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of FINCA. All monetary figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 8: FINCA Cost to the Poor per Unit of Output, 1997-2004 
Line Year ending Dec. 31   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a NPC of Poor since birth Data 79.751 229.359 429.363 514.829 899.570 1.375.541 1.560.215 1.814.457 
b Ave. loan portfolio, LP [LP(t-1)+LP]/2 166.038 531.817 843.554 1.173.287 1.538.517 2.095.585 2.678.933 4.449.271 
c Ave. number of members Data 3.324 8.473 16.400 18.634 29.224 35.610 36.912 45.432 
d Val. disbursed (ausbezahlt) Data 1.171.812 2.359.937 4.013.551 4.033.840 8.897.237 11.989.827 14.285.563 20.297.495 
e # loans issued Data 17.081 33.832 46.643 62.720 76.906 84.006 107.187 127.615 
f Epsilon Data 1,30 0,64 0,63 0,56 0,49 0,42 0,38 0,32 
g Omega Data 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 
h Nom. opp. cost equity for poor, rho Data 0,28 0,25 0,21 0,27 0,24 0,19 0,26 0,25 
i Delta at end of year i(t-1)*(1/(1+h)) 0,78 0,62 0,52 0,41 0,33 0,28 0,22 0,17 
j Delta^(t-Omega) i(t-1)*(1/(1+h))^(1-g) 0,88 0,70 0,57 0,46 0,36 0,30 0,25 0,20 
k Accum.  disc. dollar-years of debt k(t-1)+b*f 215.318 556.883 1.091.181 1.744.467 2.491.080 3.367.928 4.372.628 5.804.950 
l Accum. disc. member-years l(t-1)+c*f 4.311 9.752 20.140 30.515 44.697 59.597 73.442 88.067 
m Accum. disc. dollars distributed m(t-1)+d*j 1.034.131 2.679.367 4.956.709 6.801.953 10.038.457 13.630.937 17.138.017 21.107.903 
n Accum. disc. loans distributed n(t-1)+e*j 15.074 38.660 65.126 93.817 121.792 146.963 173.277 198.237 
o Ave. annual deposit libs. Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 (78.463) (251.093) 
p Ave. disc. ave. dep. libs. p(t-1)+o*f 0 0 0 0 0 0 (13.878) (45.181) 
q Surplus dollar year deposits Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,04 0,04 
r Social value of dep. libs. p*q 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1.177) (4.410) 
s NPC of poor since birth w/dep. libs a-r 79.751 229.359 429.363 514.829 899.570 1.375.541 1.561.392 1.818.868 
t Cost to poor/dollar-years of debt s/k 0,37 0,41 0,39 0,30 0,36 0,41 0,36 0,31 
u Cost to poor/member-years s/l 19 24 21 17 20 23 21 21 
v Cost to poor/dollar disbursed s/m 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 
w Cost to poor/loans disbursed s/n 5 6 7 5 7 9 9 9 
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of FINCA. All monetary figures in 2004 UD$. 
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Table 9: FINCA Subsidy Dependence Index, 1997-2004 
Line Year ending Dec. 31   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a r*Alpha   0,25 0,24 0,24 0,26 0,31 0,25 0,22 0,26
b r*Alpha/2 a/2 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,15 0,13 0,11 0,13
c 1-r*Alpha/2 1-b 0,87 0,88 0,88 0,87 0,85 0,87 0,89 0,87
d Tax rate, Tau   0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
e Start equity, E0 Data 0 488.155 834.361 1.209.468 1.582.592 1.938.351 2.478.988 2.513.029
f Rev. lending, LP*i Data 122.169 284.694 547.273 1.159.255 1.609.995 2.057.305 2.630.164 3.385.058
              
g Fresh funds less (TP-Tax), FF Data 638.229 645.527 641.124 638.928 1.064.597 993.743 888.826 1.812.765
h True Profit, TP Data (60.455) (79.951) (43.532) 254.005 (526.486) (-726.310) 2.077 (1.880.402)
i Tax d*Max(0,h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 415 0
j True Profit less tax, TP-Tax h-i (60.455) (79.951) (43.532) 254.005 (526.486) (726.310) 1.661 (1.880.402)
              
k Subsidy, S a*e+b*g-c*j 133.641 263.725 316.257 179.465 1.091.626 1.251.014 646.078 2.530.758
l SDI 
[a*e+b*g-c*h*
(1-d)]/[f*c(1-d)] 1,44 1,24 0,80 0,28 0,92 0,78 0,35 0,94
m Nom. yield lending in year, i Data 0,74 0,54 0,65 0,99 1,05 0,98 0,98 0,76
n Change in yield l*m 1,06 0,67 0,52 0,27 0,96 0,77 0,34 0,71
o Subsidy-free nom. yield in year m+n 1,80 1,20 1,17 1,26 2,01 1,75 1,32 1,47
p Uganda Infl. Data 0,07 0,04 0,01 0,06 0,04 (0,01) 0,05 0,05
q Subsidy-free real yield in year (o-p)/(1+p) 1,61 1,11 1,15 1,13 1,90 1,78 1,22 1,37
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of FINCA. All monetary figures in 2004 Dollars. 
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Table 10:  Faulu adjusted Assets and Liabilities, 1998-2004 
Year ending Aug. 31 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Cash and short-term invest 175.859 193.720 151.098 179.986 226.661 417.177 474.714
Portfolio performing 251.168 380.156 710.819 1.071.472 1.708.861 2.097.799 2.825.805
Portfolio at risk n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.183 20.592 59.314 73.397
Portfoilo (gross) 264.737 393.613 710.819 1.072.655 1.729.453 2.157.113 2.899.202
Reserve for loan losses (13.569) (13.457) (14.216) (21.830) (33.731) (45.806) (128.041)
Portfolio (net) 251.167 380.156 696.603 1.050.825 1.695.722 2.111.306 2.771.161
Deprec. fixed assets (net) 48.770 43.954 42.308 42.126 113.613 332.778 354.031
Non-deprec. fixed assets 425.139 313.912 311.377 263.568 600.159 74.269 63.822
Total fixed assets (net) 473.910 357.866 353.684 305.693 713.772 407.047 417.853
Long-term invest. 0 0 0 0 0 29.483 28.213
Other assets 5.444 30.646 198.832 56.609 99.725 105.953 141.932
Total assets 906.380 962.389 1.400.217 1.593.114 2.735.880 3.070.967 3.833.873
          
Deposit libs. 115.940 34.880 78.478 139.360 682.960 620.760 0
Market debt 79.338 239.613 336.596 489.150 689.263 970.856 1.840.093
Soft debt 1.951 34.865 46.431 112.646 371.733 450.961 1.000.882
Other libs 10.359 7.869 21.842 0 0 18.272 17.484
Total liabilities 207.587 317.227 483.348 741.156 1.743.956 2.060.849 2.858.460
Source: Financial statements of Faula Uganda. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 11: Faulu adjusted Income Statement, 1998-2004 
Year ending Aug. 31 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Rev. lending, LP*i 89.365 164.856 239.670 510.073 864.181 1.169.371 1.387.556
Rev. investments 31.565 3.282 0 0 0 0 0
Rev. adj. inflation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exp. adj. inflation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exp.int. deposit libs. (3.332) (1.012) n.a. (4.042) (19.808) (15.827) 0
Exp. int. market debt (12.105) (6.420) (5.348) (15.109) (65.696) (121.383) (189.293)
Exp. int. soft debt (121) (835) (963) (3.099) (3.898) (33.987) (102.218)
Financial Margin 105.372 159.871 233.360 487.824 774.779 998.174 1.096.045
Rev. other op. 22.751 35.345 77.163 49.261 26.703 37.047 5.840
Exp. other op. (60.183) (99.606) (10.040) (12.187) (4.076) (359) (5.629)
Exp. prov. reserve for loan loss 0 (50) (4.518) (8.928) (12.644) (13.574) (84.209)
Exp. extraord. write-offs(net) 0 0 0 -311 0 0 0
Exp. personnel (128.521) (169.290) (254.972) (344.876) (393.483) (412.773) (547.748)
Exp. adminsitration 0 0 (241.026) (277.433) (367.157) (483.218) (567.422)
Exp. depreciation (7.646) (10.792) (13.589) n.a n.a n.a n.a
Operating margin (68.226) (84.521) (213.621) (106.649) 24.122 125.296 (103.123)
Rev. extraordinary (net) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rev. grants, RG 175.147 160.831 275.664 53.754 53.526 25.560 19.196
Acct. profit, AP 106.921 76.310 62.042 (52.896) 77.648 150.856 (83.928)
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 (15.880) (1.217)
Dividends declared, Div 0 0 0 0 0 (6.756) 0
Change retained earnings 106.921 76.310 62.042 (52.896) 77.648 128.220 (85.145)
Source: Financial statements of Faula Uganda. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 12: Faulu adjusted Equity, 1998-2004 
Year ending Dec. 31 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Open retained earnings 45.800 152.720 214.515 266.846 221.476 292.911 390.519
Change retained earnings 106.920 76.947 62.042 -48.069 71.434 134.185 13.006
Close retained earnings 152.720 229.667 276.557 218.777 292.911 427.096 403.525
Open reserve adj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.465
Change reserve and adj. 0 0 0 0 0 7.071 (6.465)
Close reserve and adj. 0 0 0 0 0 7.071 0
Open direct grants 0 546.074 393.115 0 15.542 73.560 0
Change direct grants 546.074 (125.190) (393.115) 15.353 58.017 (73.560) 0
Close direct grants 546.074 420.884 0 15.353 73.560 0 0
Open-paid-in cap. public 0 0 0 616.774 624.385 624.385 570.912
Change paid-in cap. public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Close paid-in cap. public 0 0 639.220 616.774 624.385 624.385 570.912
Open-paid-in cap. private 0 0 0 1.054 1.067 1.067 976
Change paid-in cap. private 0 0 1.093 0 0 0 0
Close paid-in cap. private 0 0 1.093 1.054 1.067 1.067 976
Total equity 698.794 650.551 916.869 851.957 991.922 1.059.619 975.412
Source: Financial statements of Faula Uganda. All figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 13: Faulu Net Present Cost to the Poor since Birth in 1998 through 2004 
Line Year ending Aug. 31   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a Real opp. cost Equity for the poor Data 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
b inflation given IAS 29 practice Data 0,04 0,01 0,06 0,04 -0,01 0,05 0,05
c Nom. opp. cost equity for poor rho a+b+a*b 0,25 0,21 0,27 0,24 0,19 0,26 0,25
d Beta 0 Data 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e Beta t Data 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f Delta for poor at the end of the year f(t-1)*(1/(1+c)) 0,80 0,67 0,56 0,46 0,39 0,32 0,27
g Gamma for the poor, since birth Data 0,85 0,72 0,52 0,44 0,45 0,27 0,22
h Beta t*Delta e*f 0,80 0,67 0,56 0,46 0,39 0,32 0,27
i Start Equity Eo Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
j Fresh funds less (TP-Tax), FF Data 721.562 586.489 925.721 708.725 822.796 778.512 837.656
k Accumulated FF k(t-1)+j 721.562 1.308.051 2.233.772 2.942.497 3.765.293 4.543.805 5.381.461
l Accum. discounted FF l(t-1)+g*j 611.100 1.031.475 1.509.159 1.822.451 2.188.961 2.398.507 2.580.292
m Private paid-in capital Data 0 0 1.093 1.054 1.067 1.067 976
n Accum. private paid-in cap. n(t-1)+m 0 0 1.093 2.147 3.214 4.281 5.257
o Accum. disc. private paid-in cap. o(t-1)+g*m 0 0 564 1.030 1.505 1.793 2.004
p Dividends, Div. Data 0 0 0 10501 0 0 0
q Accumulated Dividends q(t-1)+p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r Accum. discounted dividends r(t-1)+l*p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s True Profit Data (68.568) (89.295) (223.367) (128.440) (46.136) (2.204) (349.696)
t Actual Tax Data 0 0 0 0 0 24.681 1.892
u True Profit less actual tax s-t (68.568) (89.295) (223.367) (128.440) (46.136) (26.885) (351.588)
v Accum. TP-Tax v(t-1)+u (68.568) (157.863) (381.229) (509.669) (555.805) (582.690) (934.278)
w Term 1 (d-h)*i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x Term 2 l-h*k 32.926 159.534 268.307 460.329 736.456 937.820 1.138.653
y Term 3 o 0 0 564 1.030 1.505 1.793 2.004
z Term 4 r-h*q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
aa Term 5 h*v (54.942) (105.231) (211.772) (235.933) (214.408) (187.316) (250.284)
bb NPC of Poor since birth w+x-(y+z+aa) 87.868 264.765 479.515 695.232 949.359 1.123.344 1.386.932
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of Faulu Uganda. All monetary figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 14: Faulu Cost to the Poor per Unit of Output, 1998-2004 
Line Year ending Dec. 31   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a NPC of Poor since birth Data 87.868 264.765 479.515 695.232 949.359 1.123.344 1.386.932
b Ave. loan portfolio, LP ([LP(t-1)+LP]/2 125.584 315.662 538.380 873.714 1.373.273 1.903.514 2.441.234
c Ave. number of members Data 5.170 8.070 13.085 18.861 24.016 27.464 31.459
d Val. disbursed (ausbezahlt) Data 149.749 131.037 153.910 156.572 192.348 220.701 255.787
e # loans issued Data n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
f Epsilon Data 0,86 0,69 0,65 0,57 0,50 0,45 0,41
g Omega Data 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
h Nom. opp. cost equity for poor, rho Data 0,25 0,21 0,27 0,24 0,19 0,26 0,25
i Delta at end of year i(t-1)*(1/(1+h)) 0,80 0,66 0,52 0,42 0,35 0,28 0,22
j Delta^(t-Omega) i(t-1)*(1/(1+h))^(1-g) 0,90 0,73 0,59 0,47 0,38 0,32 0,25
k Accum. disc. dollar-years of debt k(t-1)+b*f 180.562 195.761 401.696 708.379 1.145.258 1.768.031 2.549.034
l Accum. disc. member-years l(t-1)+c*f 4.469 10.073 18.609 29.353 41.362 53.817 66.724
m Accum. disc. dollars distributed m(t-1)+d*j 119.991 206.794 286.948 360.078 434.079 503.648 567.884
n Accum. disc. loans distributed n(t-1)+e*j n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
o Ave. annual deposit libs. Data 57.970 75.410 56.679 108.919 411.160 651.860 0
p Ave. disc. ave. dep. libs. p(t-1)+o*f 28.985 66.690 95.030 149.489 355.069 680.999 680.999
q Surplus dollar year deposits Data 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
r Social value of dep. libs. p*q 580 1.334 1.901 2.990 7.101 13.620 13.620
s NPC of poor since birth w/dep. libs a-r 87.288 263.431 477.614 692.242 942.258 1.109.724 1.373.312
t Cost to poor/dollar-years of debt s/k 0,80 1,34 1,18 0,97 0,82 0,62 0,54
u Cost to poor/member-years s/l 19,40 26,02 25,56 23,48 22,61 20,37 20,79
v Cost to poor/dollar disbursed s/m 0,72 1,27 1,66 1,91 2,15 2,18 2,44
w Cost to poor/loans disbursed s/n n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of Faulu Uganda. All monetary figures in 2004 US$. 
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Table 15: Faulu Subsidy Dependence Index, 1998-2004 
Line Year ending Dec. 31   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
a r*Alpha  0,26 0,24 0,25 0,27 0,34 0,29 0,27
b r*Alpha/2 a/2 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,14 0,17 0,15 0,13
c 1-r*Alpha/2 1-b 0,87 0,88 0,88 0,86 0,83 0,85 0,87
d Tax rate, Tau  0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
e Start equity, E0 Data 0 698.794 650.551 916.869 851.957 991.922 1.059.619
f Rev. lending, LP*i Data 89.365 164.856 239.670 510.073 864.181 1.169.371 1.387.556
            
g Fresh funds less (TP-Tax), FF Data 721.562 586.489 925.721 708.725 822.796 778.512 837.656
h True Profit, TP Data (68.568) (89.295) (223.367) (128.440) (46.136) (2.204) (349.696)
i Tax d*Max(0,h) 0 0 0 0 0 (441) (69.939)
j True Profit less tax, TP-Tax h-i (68.568) (89.295) (223.367) (128.440) (46.136) (1.764) (279.757)
            
k Subsidy, S a*e+b*g-c*j 151.927 320.196 472.506 460.088 465.761 405.125 636.904
l SDI 
[a*e+b*g-c*h*
(1-d)]/[f*c(1-d)] 2,24 2,63 2,58 1,24 0,80 0,51 0,66
m Nom. yield lending in year, i Data 0,71 0,52 0,45 0,58 0,63 0,61 0,57
n Change in yield l*m 1,60 1,37 1,15 0,73 0,50 0,31 0,38
o Subsidy-free nom. yield in year m+n 2,31 1,90 1,59 1,31 1,13 0,93 0,94
p Uganda Infl. Data 0,043 0,008 0,062 0,036 (0,012) 0,047 0,045
q Subsidy-free real yield in year (o-p)/(1+p) 2,17 1,87 1,44 1,23 1,16 0,84 0,86
Source: Authors own calculation based on financial satements of Faulu Uganda. All monetary figures in 2004 US$. 
 
 
 XVI 
REFERENCES 
 
AMFIU (2005): AMFIU Homepage: www.amfiu.org.ug. (12.04.05). 
 
AMFIU (2003): Annual Report 2003. 
www.amfiu.org.ug/docs/annual_report%202003.pdf. (06.10.05). 
 
Apire, R. (2002): Uganda’s Financial Sector and Capital Markets. In: Proceedings 
of the Symposium on Modalities for financing SMEs in Uganda, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva. www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
itetebmisc8_en.pdf (22.07.05). 
 
Arndt, H. W. (1988): “Market Failure” and Underdevelopment. In: World 
Development, Vol. 16, No.2, pp. 219-229, 1998. 
 
Berger, M. (2000): Microfinance: An Emerging Market within the Emerging 
Markets. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC. 
www.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/3244 (13.08.05) 
 
Besley, T. (1994): How do market failures justify interventions in rural credit 
markets? In: The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 9:1, pp. 27-47. 
 
Borchert and Goos, (2004): Analysen von Märkten mit assymetrischen 
Informarionen – Zum Nobelpreis von Georg A. Akerlof, Michael Spence 
und Joseph E. Stieglitz. Georg August Universität Göttingen, Institut für 
Wirtschaftsinformatik, Arbeitbericht 30/2004. www.wi2.wiso.uni-
goettingen.de/getfile?DateiID=536 (23.08.05). 
 
Braun G. (2005): Comparative Database Uganda, www.microfinance 
gateway.org/resource_centers/reg_sup/micro_reg/country/46/ (12.08.05) 
 
Christen, R., P., Rosenberg, R. (2000): The Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks 
of Microfinance, GCAP Occasional Paper 4 (Washington). 
www.cgap.org/docs/OccasionalPaper_04.pdf (22.08.05). 
 
De Aghion,, B. A., Morduch, J. (2005): The Economics of Microfinance, MIT 
Press Massachusetts 2005. 
 
FINCA (2005): Incofin Factsheet 2001 – 2004. Unpublished data sheet. 
 
Goodwin-Groen, R., Bruett, T., Latortue, A. (2004): Uganda Microfinance Sector 
Effectiveness Review. www.cgap.org/docs/clear_uganda_report.pdf. 
(08.08.05). 
 
Hanning, A,. Mugwanya, E.K. (2000): How to regulate and supervise 
microcredit? – Key issues in an international perspective, FDS Series 
No.1, Bank of Uganda, German Technical Co-operation. 
www.microfinancegateway.org/files/2652_RegUganda.doc. (14.09.05). 
 
 XVII 
Hardy, D.-C., Holden, P., Prokopenko, V. (2002): Microfinance Institutions and 
Public Policy, IMF Working Paper 02/158 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund). www.microfinancegateway.org/files/3461_MFIPP. doc. 
(01.07.05). 
 
Hemmer, H.-R. (2002):Wirtschaftsprobleme der Entwicklungsländer, 3.A., Verlag 
Franz Vahlen München. 
 
Hishigsuren, G. (1999): Cost Benefit Analysis Applied to Micro Credit Program 
Evaluation, University Indiana. www.mireda.org/DOCUMENTS/ 
00687.pdf. (18.08.05). 
 
Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J.-E. (1993): Imperfect Information and Rural Credit 
Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. In: The Economics of Rural 
Organization, ed. by Hoff, K., Braverman, A., Stiglitz, J.-E., Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Kalyango, D.L. (2005): Uganda’s Experience with the Regulatory and 
Supervisory Framework for Microfinance Institutions. Essays on 
Regulation and Supervision, No.9, Bank of Uganda. www. 
microfinancegateway.com/files/25977_file_Uganda.pdf (17.08.05) 
 
KfW (2002): Siebter Evaluierungsbericht über Projekte und Programme in 
Entwicklungsländern. KfW Frankfurt am Main. 
 
Köhler, W. (2004): Großer Plan ums kleine Geld, in: Akzente 4.04, pp. 18-21. 
http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/de-akzente0404-uganda.pdf. (12.07.05). 
 
Ledgerwood, J., Burand D., Braun, G. (2002) The Micro Deposit-Taking 
Institutions Bill 2002, Summary of Workshops and Information Exchange 
Events, SPEED – USAID. 
 
MicroRate (2004): Faulu Uganda Limited. http://www.mixmarket.org/en/ 
demand/demand .show.profile.asp?token=&ett=397#. (02.07.05). 
 
Morduch, J.(1999): The role of subsidies in microfinance: evidence from the 
Grameen Bank. In: Journal of Development Economics, 60, pp. 229-248. 
 
Myint, H. (1985): Organizational dualism and economic development. In: Asian 
Development Review, Vol. 3, No.1 1985. 
 
Nannyonjo, J., Nsubuga J. (2004): Recognizing the Role of Micro Finance 
Institutions in Uganda, Bank of Uganda Working Paper. 
www.bou.or.ug/Role.pfd (13.09.05). 
 
Okurut, N., et al (2004): Credit Demand and Credit Rationing in the Informal 
Financial Sector in Uganda, Forum Paper to: African Development and 
Poverty Reduction: The Macro-Micro Linkage. www.tips.org.za/events 
/forum2004/Papers/Credit_demand_and_rationing_in_Uganda_Okurut.pdf 
(12.08.05). 
 XVIII
 
Robinson, M.S. (2001): The Microfinance Revolution, Vol. 1 Sustainable Finance 
for the Poor, The Word Bank, Washington. D.C.. 
 
Schreiner, M, and Yaron, P. (1999): The Subsidy Dependence Index and Recent 
Attempts to Adjust it. http://www.microfinancegateway.org /files/1415 
_1415.pdf. (12.05.05). 
 
Schreiner, M. (1997): A Framework for the Analysis of the Performance and 
Sustainability of Subsidized Microfinance Organizations With Application 
to BancoSol of Bolivia and Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Ph. D. 
dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1997. www.microfinance.com. 
(23.01.05). 
 
Terberger-Stoy, E. (2001): Mikrofinanzierung – ein Mittel gegen 
Armutsbekämpfung ohne unerwünschte Nebenwirkung?. In: Verteilung 
und Entwicklung, Tagungsband zum 4. Limburg Seminar “Wissenschaft 
und Praxis der Entwicklungspolitik, Eisenach, Verein für 
Entwicklungsökonomische Forschungsförderung. 
 
UBOS (2005): Homepage of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. www.ubos.org. 
(12.07.05). 
Wright, G.A.N., Rippey, P., (2003): The Competitive Environment in Uganda: 
Implications for Microfinance Institutions and their Clients, MicroSave. 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/19164_ST_CompetEnv_Ugand
a.pdf. (18.07.05). 
 
Yaron, J. (1992): Successful Rural Finance Institutions. World Bank Discussion 
Paper No. 150, The World Bank Washington, D.C.. http://www-wds. 
Worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/21/000178
830_98101903550652/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. (18.03.05). 
 
Ziller, A., Phibbs, P., (2003): Social Impacts and CBA - Integrating social impacts 
into cost-benefit analysis: a participate method: case study: the NSW area 
assistance scheme, in: Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, pp. 141-
146. www.communitybuilders.nsw.gov.au/ppp2/PPR8%20%20Integrated 
%20Cost%20Benefit%20Methodolgy.pdf. (02.06.05). 
 
                                            
 
